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RELIEF IN THE BOARDROOM: HOW THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S CITX
DECISION WEAKENED DEEPENING INSOLVENCY AS AN
INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION
BRYA M. KEILSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
D IRECTORS and officers of corporations have always had to worry
about certain causes of action being brought against them, including
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and negligence. But recently there has
been a new cause of action to worry about. The recent trend is for the
fiduciaries of a bankruptcy estate to include deepening insolvency as a
cause of action brought against directors and officers-a trend that has
caused much tension in the boardroom. While the concept of deepening
insolvency was first discussed in case law over twenty years ago, only in the
recent years since the Enron and WorldCom collapses has deepening in-
solvency made its way back into the courts. As a result of the increasing
popularity of deepening insolvency, a growing number of courts have
faced the question of whether to recognize deepening insolvency as (1) a
valid independent cause of action itself; (2) a measure of damages for an
independent tort; or (3) neither as a valid independent cause of action
nor a measure of damages. The Third Circuit has been an influential
court in developing this area of law, having issued two important and prec-
edential opinions in recent years, with the most recent coming in the sum-
mer of 2006. Although the first Third Circuit deepening insolvency
opinion helped shape and develop the concept as an independent tort,
the most recent Third Circuit opinion on deepening insolvency, as well as
the opinions of the influential Delaware Chancery and Supreme Courts,
will drastically limit courts' acceptance and application of this theory.
* Ms. Keilson is an associate in the business practice group of the
Wilmington, Delaware and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania offices of Eckert Seamans
Cherin & Mellott, LLC where she focuses her practice on bankruptcy and
commercial litigation. She is a 2004 graduate of Villanova University School of
Law. The author would like to thank Eduardo Texidor, Jr. for providing his
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II. WHAT EXACTLY Is DEEPENING INSOLVENCY? TRACING ITS ROOTS
Deepening insolvency is a developing theory that is generally de-
scribed as "an injury to the Debtors' corporate property from the fraudu-
lent expansion of corporate debt and prolongation of corporate life."'
The first case to discuss the general concept of deepening insolvency was
Bloor v. Dansker (In re Investors Funding Corporation of New York Securities Liti-
gation).2 In Investors Funding, the plaintiff brought a cause of action
against the debtor's auditors for, among other things, committing fraud
on the debtor.3 The defendants argued that any fraud perpetrated actu-
ally benefited the debtor by allowing the debtor to continue operations
three years past the point of insolvency. 4 The court rejected this argu-
ment, however, noting that "[a] corporation is not a biological entity for
which it can be presumed that any act which extends its existence is bene-
ficial to it."
5
The second case that helped spark the discussion of deepening insol-
vency came a few years later. In Schacht v. Brown,6 the Director of Insur-
ance of the State of Illinois, as statutory liquidator of Reserve Insurance
Company ("Reserve"), brought an action against Reserve's former direc-
tors and officers, as well as other related defendants. 7 As the court noted:
The main focus of the allegations is that, as a result of the fraudu-
lent actions of the various defendants, Reserve's corporate parent
was caused to continue Reserve in business even though the lat-
ter was insolvent[ ] and was caused to saddle Reserve with addi-
tional liabilities and drive it deeper into insolvency, all of which
consequences resulted in damage to Reserve, as well as its policy-
holders and creditors .... 8
The court recognized that the actions of Reserve's directors, among other
parties, led to Reserve continuing in business "past the point of insolvency
.... .9 The defendants' response was that by virtue of Reserve remaining
in business beyond insolvency and to the detriment of the creditors, Re-
serve actually benefited. 10 The court did not find this argument persua-
sive in the least, however, stating that "the prolonged artificial insolvency
1. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d
340, 347 (3d Cir. 2001).
2. 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
3. See id. at 541 (discussing cause of action).
4. See id. (same).
5. Id.
6. 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983).
7. Id. at 1343.
8. Id. at 1345.
9. Id. at 1348.
10. See id. at 1348 (discussing defendants' argument). "These defendants ar-
gue that, since Reserve was a wholly-owned subsidiary of ARC, the owners of Re-
serve, i.e. ARC shareholders, automatically benefited from the direct draining of
Reserve and the fraudulent prolongation of Reserve's life." Id. at n.4.
[Vol. 52: p. 975
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of Reserve benefited only Reserve's managers and the other alleged con-
spirators, not the corporation."'
The defendants also argued that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue
on behalf of the corporation, and they cited to several cases to support the
proposition that "a corporation may never sue to recover damages alleged
to have resulted from the artificial prolongation of an insolvent corpora-
tion's life."' 2 The court rejected this argument as well, stating that it
would not speculate whether the Illinois state courts would accept such a
restriction on the plaintiff's action. 13 The court reasoned as follows:
[E]ach of these cases rests upon a seriously flawed assumption,
i.e., that the fraudulent prolongation of a corporation's life be-
yond insolvency is automatically to be considered a benefit to the
corporation's interests. This premise collides with common
sense, for the corporate body is ineluctably damaged by the deep-
ening of its insolvency through increased exposure to creditor
liability. Indeed, in most cases, it would be crucial that the insol-
vency of the corporation be disclosed, so that shareholders may
exercise their right to dissolve the corporation in order to cut
their losses. Thus, acceptance of a rule which would bar a corpo-
ration from recovering damages due to the hiding of informa-
tion concerning its insolvency would create perverse incentives
for wrong-doing officers and directors to conceal the true finan-
cial condition of the corporation from the corporate body as
long as possible. We are not prepared to conclude that the Illi-
nois courts would adopt such a regime.1 4
11. Id. at 1348.
12. Id. at 1349-50. Three of the cases the defendants cited were Bergeson v.
Life Insurance Corporation, 265 F.2d 227, 232 (10th Cir. 1959), Kinter v. Connolly, 81
A. 905, 905 (Pa. 1911) and Patterson v. Franklin, 35 A. 205, 206 (Pa. 1896). In
Bergeson, the plaintiffs alleged that the corporation was harmed because the de-
fendants initially asserted that subscription notes had value and then later acknowl-
edged that the notes did not have value. 265 F.2d at 232. The court stated that
"[t]he situation may cause one to lift a querulous eyebrow but it does so because
the company received a benefit, not because the company suffered any detriment."
Id. In Kinter, the Court stated:
If the defendants published statements which they knew, or ought to have
known, to be false, with the result that their company gained a fictitious
credit at the expense of those thus encouraged to do business with it, the
wrong was suffered by the latter, and not by the corporation, and gave
rise to no liability on the part of the defendants that the corporation or
its receiver can enforce.
81 A. at 905 In Patterson, the Court held that while parties who were affected by the
fraud perpetuated by the defendants had cause to complain, the corporation itself
could not complain. 35 A. at 206. After all, "[tihe fraud was perpetuated for its
benefit. It was a gainer, not a loser, because of it." Id.
13. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983) ("This premise
collides with common sense, for the corporate body is ineluctably damaged by the
deepening of its insolvency, through increased exposure to creditor liability.").
14. Id. (citations omitted).
2007]
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It was through this language that the court opened the door for causes of
action against directors and officers who prolong the life of a corporation
and thereby drive the corporation deeper into debt.
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S FIRST INTERPRETATION OF THE DEEPENING
INSOLVENCY THEORY
The next seminal case in the development of the cause of action of
deepening insolvency after Schacht was the Third Circuit's decision in Offi-
cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.15 In Lafferty, the
Third Circuit addressed whether deepening insolvency should be recog-
nized as an independent tort.16 The plaintiff, a committee of creditors,
filed its complaint against numerous parties, including the debtors and
the debtors' principals.1 7 In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendants caused the debtors' deepening insolvency.' 8 In addressing the
question of "[w]hether deepening insolvency is a valid theory that gives
rise to a cognizable injury under state law," the court noted that neither
the Pennsylvania appellate courts nor any federal courts interpreting
Pennsylvania law had yet addressed the issue of deepening insolvency and
whether it was a viable independent cause of action. 19 The court, there-
fore, looked to the policy that underlies Pennsylvania tort law and deci-
sions that have interpreted the law of other jurisdictions with regard to
deepening insolvency.20 The court concluded that, "if faced with the is-
sue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would determine that 'deepening
insolvency' may give rise to a cognizable injury."2 '
The Third Circuit based its finding on the following:
First and foremost, the theory is essentially sound. Under federal
bankruptcy law, insolvency is a financial condition in which a cor-
15. 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001).
16. See id. at 350-52 (discussing tort of deepening insolvency and challenges
raised by defendant).
17. See id. at 344 (setting forth factual and procedural background of case).
The debtors were two related companies, namely Walnut Associates, Inc. and
ELCOA. See id. ELCOA was formed by Walnut's principals after Walnut began
experiencing financial difficulties. See id. ELCOA was wholly owned by Walnut.
See id. The committee alleged in its lawsuit that the defendants fraudulently in-
duced the debtors to issue debt certificates, thereby deepening the debtors' insol-
vency and forcing the debtors into bankruptcy. See id. at 344-45. The defendants
filed a motion to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion, finding that
the defendants had a complete in pai delicto defense. See id. at 346. The commit-
tee then appealed. See id.
18. Id. at 344-45 (arguing that defendants "deepened the insolvency of Wal-
nut and ELCOA, and put them on the path to bankruptcy").
19. Id. at 349. The court, therefore, recognized that it "must don the sooth-
sayer's garb and predict how that court would rule if it were presented with the
question." Id.
20. See id. (determining whether Pennsylvania courts would recognize deep-
ening insolvency as cause of action).
21. Id.
978 [Vol. 52: p. 975
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poration's debts exceed the fair market value of its assets. Even
when a corporation is insolvent, its corporate property may have
value. The fraudulent and concealed incurrence of debt can
damage that value in several ways. For example, to the extent
that bankruptcy is not already a certainty, the incurrence of debt
can force an insolvent corporation into bankruptcy, thus in-
flicting legal and administrative costs on the corporation ....
Aside from causing actual bankruptcy, deepening insolvency can
undermine a corporation's relationships with its customers, sup-
pliers[ ] and employees. The very threat of bankruptcy, brought
about through fraudulent debt, can shake the confidence of par-
ties dealing with the corporation, calling into question its ability
to perform, thereby damaging the corporation's assets, the value
of which often depends on the performance of other parties. In
addition, prolonging an insolvent corporation's life through bad
debt may simply cause the dissipation of corporate assets.
22
In addition, the Third Circuit noted the increasing acceptance of the the-
ory of deepening insolvency and highlighted the venerable principle of
Pennsylvania jurisprudence that "where there is an injury, the law provides
a remedy." 23 In light of this "remedial theme," the Third Circuit found
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would recognize deepening insol-
vency as an independent tort giving rise to a cognizable injury. 24
22. Id. at 349-50 (citations omitted).
23. Id. at 351.
24. Id. at 352. It should be noted that, despite recognizing the independent
tort of deepening insolvency, the Third Circuit dismissed the plaintiff's claim be-
cause of the in parti delicto defense. See id. at 354. After determining that the plain-
tiff had standing to bring its deepening insolvency claims, the Third Circuit
analyzed the defendant's asserted in pari delicto defense. See id. at 354-60 (address-
ing defendant's defense to deepening insolvency claim). The court first explained
that "[t] he doctrine of in pari delicto provides that a plaintiff may not assert a claim
against a defendant if the plaintiff bears fault for the claim." Id. at 354. As such,
the plaintiff is barred from asserting such a claim. See id. Whether the defendant
may validly assert such a defense depends on whether the wrongdoer's conduct
can be imputed to the debtor and, consequently, the plaintiff who stands in the
shoes of the debtor. See id. at 355.
In analyzing whether the wrongdoer's conduct can be imputed to the plain-
tiff, the court first set forth the principle that "courts impute the fraud of an officer
to a corporation when the officer commits the fraud (1) in the course of his em-
ployment[ ] and (2) for the benefit of the corporation." Id. at 358. The court
quickly found that the fraud committed by the defendants did in fact take place in
the course of their employment with the debtors. See id. at 359. With regard to the
second requirement, the court noted that this question is typically analyzed under
the adverse interest exception. See id. Under the adverse interest exception,
"fraudulent conduct will not be imputed if the officer's interests were adverse to
the corporation and 'not for the benefit of the corporation."' Id. (citing Waslow v.
Grant Thornton L.L.P. (In reJack Greenberg, Inc.), 212 B.R. 76, 83 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1997)). As the court noted, however, the adverse interest exception has an
exception itself: the "sole actor" exception. See id. at 359. The sole actor exception
states that "if an agent is the sole representative of a principal, then that agent's
5
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IV. A SURVEY OF RECENT DEEPENING INSOLVENCY CASES: INDEPENDENT
CAUSE OF ACTION, MEASURE OF DAMAGES OR NEITHER?
2 5
In the recent years since the Lafferty decision, several courts have ad-
dressed the validity of the concept of deepening insolvency. The courts
that have addressed this concept are divided over whether deepening in-
solvency is an independent cause of action, a measure of damages for an
independent tort or neither. The majority of courts finding deepening
insolvency to be an independent cause of action hold that, to be success-
ful, the moving party must demonstrate that the defendants engaged in
fraudulent conduct and, therefore, committed an intentional tort. The
minority of courts, on the other hand, hold that a party can succeed in
bringing a deepening insolvency claim by showing that the defendant ei-
ther engaged in negligent conduct or negligently failed to act.
A. Deepening Insolvency as an Independent Cause of Action
The courts that have recognized deepening insolvency as an indepen-
dent cause of action have followed one of two paths, with the majority view
requiring an additional showing of fraudulent conduct. Specifically, the
elements of the majority view are: (1) the fraudulent or wrongful prolon-
gation of an insolvent business entity's life; (2) that causes the entity to
become more insolvent by incurring additional liabilities or dissipating as-
sets; (3) so that the value that could have been realized if the entity's busi-
ness activity had not been improperly prolonged is lost; and (4) as a result,
the entity suffers harm distinct from the harm suffered by its creditors. In
contrast, the elements of the minority view are: (1) a party engaged in a
negligent act or negligently failed to act; (2) the act prolonged the life of
the insolvent entity or allowed it to take on additional debt; and (3) as a
result, the entity suffered harm distinct from the harm suffered by its
creditors.
1. Intentional Tort - Fraud Required
Following in the footsteps of the Third Circuit in Lafferty, the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held in Official Com-
mittee of Unsecured Creditors v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Exide Technolo-
gies, Inc.)26 that the "Delaware Supreme Court would recognize a claim for
fraudulent conduct is imputable to the principal regardless of whether the agent's
conduct was adverse to the principal's interest." Id. The court found that the sole
actor exception applied because, among other factors, one of the wrongdoers was
the sole shareholder of the debtors. See id. at 360. As a result, the Third Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs cause of action. See id. (de-
termining that defendant had complete defense to defendant's cause of action).
25. It must be noted that certain cases discussed in the survey have since been
superceded by subsequent case law from the relevant state supreme court or court
of appeals. These cases are included in the survey, however, to illustrate the
development of deepening insolvency and the Third Circuit's impact in this area.
26. 299 B.R. 732 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
[Vol. 52: p. 975
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deepening insolvency when there has been damage to corporate prop-
erty."2 7 In reaching this conclusion, the court first noted that the Dela-
ware Supreme Court had not yet addressed the issue of whether
deepening insolvency is a valid tort.28 The court then looked to the Laf-
ferty opinion and agreed with the view of the Third Circuit that the theory
of deepening insolvency is sound and that there is growing acceptance of
the theory.29 The court found that Delaware, like Pennsylvania, has
adopted the principle that "the 'function of a damage award in a civil liti-
gation is to provide just and full compensation to a plaintiff who suffers
injury or loss by reason of the conduct of the tortfeaser." 30 The court
then predicted that the Delaware courts would recognize deepening insol-
vency as a valid cause of action.3 1
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Ten-
nessee addressed the question of whether deepening insolvency is an inde-
pendent intentional tort in Limor v. Buerger (In re Del-Met Corp.).32 In Del-
Met, one of the claims the trustee brought against the director and other
defendants was a claim for deepening insolvency. 33 Tennessee courts had
not yet addressed the issue, making it necessary for the court to determine
"whether the Tennessee Supreme Court would recognize deepening insol-
vency as an actionable breach of duty."34 In its analysis, the Court re-
viewed the Third Circuit's decision in Lafferty and found it to be
"sound."35 As a result, the court concluded that "if presented with com-
pelling facts, the Tennessee Supreme Court would recognize deepening
insolvency as an actionable breach of duty to a corporation." 36
Later that year, the District Court for the District of Delaware dis-
cussed deepening insolvency in Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP (In re Stu-
dent Finance Corporation).3 7 In Student Finance, the Chapter 7 trustee
brought an action against a number of defendants, including a law firm,
an attorney and other related individuals.3 8 In the second count, the trus-
tee alleged that "all Defendants engaged in tortious conduct that caused
27. Id. at 752. It should be noted, as discussed below, that the Delaware Su-
preme Court has subsequently held that deepening insolvency is not a valid cause
of action in Delaware. See infra text accompanying notes 91-97.
28. Id. at 751 (explaining that court "must predict how the Delaware Supreme
Court would rule on the claim if such claim was presented to it").
29. Id. at 751-52.
30. See id. (quoting Maier v. Santucci, 697 A.2d 747, 749 (Del. 1997)) (deter-
mining that deepening insolvency would be recognized by Delaware courts).
31. See id. (same).
32. 322 B.R. 781 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2005).
33. See id. at 807 (discussing claims brought by trustee).
34. Id. at 813 (recognizing that court's task was same task that Third Circuit
had undertaken in Lafferty).
35. See id. at 815 (discussing Lafferty's analysis of deepening insolvency).
36. Id.
37. 335 B.R. 539 (D. Del. 2005).
38. Id. at 545.
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injury to SFC [the debtor] through the wrongful expansion of corporate
debt and prolongation of corporate life beyond insolvency."3 9 The de-
fendants responded that, among other things, the trustee failed to allege
all necessary elements of a deepening insolvency claim and, in particular,
failed to allege fraud with the required particularity.40 The court
agreed. 41 In so finding, the court noted that while the Third Circuit in
Lafferty did not specify the necessary elements of deepening insolvency,
the Third Circuit "did state that 'the Committee alleges an injury to the
Debtors' corporate property from the fraudulent expansion of corporate
debt and prolongation of corporate life. This type of injury has been re-
ferred to as 'deepening insolvency.'1,4 2 Further, the court made reference
to the fact that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania had also concluded that fraud must be alleged for a deepen-
ing insolvency claim to stand.
43
A few months later, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware
issued another deepening insolvency opinion in OHC Liquidation Trust v.
Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Oakwood Homes Corporation).44 In Oakwood,
the court was faced with a motion to dismiss in which one of the matters at
issue was a deepening insolvency count.4 5 The court first noted that
North Carolina, New York or Delaware law applied. 46 The court, however,
did not decide which law should apply because it believed the outcome
would be the same under the laws of all three states.4 7 In analyzing
whether deepening insolvency is a valid theory under North Carolina, New
York and Delaware law, the court first recognized that the highest courts
in all three states-the Delaware Supreme Court, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court and the New York Court of Appeals-have not ruled on the
validity of deepening insolvency as an independent cause of action.
4 8
39. Id. at 547-48.
40. See id. at 548 (discussing deepening insolvency count).
41. See id. (same). The court noted that a trustee must specifically "allege that
the defendant defrauded the debtor." Id. If the trustee only alleges that the de-
fendant defrauded creditors, the trustee would lack standing to bring a deepening
insolvency claim. See id. (noting that trustee may only bring cause of action for
harms suffered by debtor). Specifically, the trustee
could not bring it under [11 U.S.C.] § 541 because it would not be a
claim that the debtor could have brought on its own behalf as of the
commencement of the case, nor could he bring it under [11 U.S.C.]
§ 544 because that section deals only with a trustee's powers regarding
avoidance actions and does not empower him to pursue tort claims.
Id. at 548-49.
42. Id.
43. See id. (noting requirement of fraud in deepening insolvency causes of
action in cases out of District Court for Eastem District of Pennsylvania).
44. 340 B.R. 510 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
45. See id. at 527 (discussing procedural background of case).
46. Id.
47. See id. at 528 (discussing choice of law issues).
48. See id. at 528 (citing to cases that state that highest court of Delaware,
North Carolina and New York have not yet ruled on validity of deepening insol-
982 [Vol. 52: p. 975
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While the court noted that the trend seems to be against recognition of
deepening insolvency as a valid independent tort, the court ultimately
held that Delaware, North Carolina and New York would all recognize it as
such. 49 The court declined to follow the trend because it was bound by
"what the Third Circuit would predict the state law was with regard to
deepening insolvency as an independent tort."50 In light of Lafferty, the
court held that Delaware, New York and North Carolina state courts would
indeed recognize deepening insolvency as a valid cause of action.
5 1
Once the court found that deepening insolvency is a valid cause of
action, it then had to determine what elements the plaintiff must prove to
sustain such a cause of action. 52 The court noted that most courts within
the Third Circuit that have addressed this issue have found that a showing
of fraud is required.5 3 In addition, the Lafferty court's discussion of deep-
ening insolvency was centered on fraud. 54 Therefore, the court found
that a plaintiff is required to prove fraud, and not mere negligence, to
sustain a deepening insolvency claim. 5
5
2. Negligence is Sufficient to Sustain a Deepening Insolvency Cause of Action
Despite the holding in the majority of cases that a plaintiff must allege
fraud to maintain a deepening insolvency claim, a few courts have sug-
gested that allegations of negligence are sufficient to support such a claim.
For example, in Tabas v. Greenleaf Ventures, Inc. (In re Flagship Healthcare,
Inc.),5 6 the court, after discussing the defendants' alleged negligence, ac-
vency). The court did recognize, however, that several federal courts have at-
tempted to predict how each of these states' highest courts would come down on
the issue. See id. (noting that these decisions, however, are "far from uniform").
49. See id. at 528-29. "In the last few years, a growing number of federal courts
have issued opinions strongly implying that deepening insolvency aught not be
recognized as an independent tort." Id. at 528. The court discussed In re Global
Services as the case that sparked this trend. See id. (discussing In re Global Services
and listing cases that have followed its reasoning).
50. Id. at 530-31.
51. See id. at 531 (noting that Delaware, North Carolina and New York "all
adhere to the broad remedial themes discussed in Lafferty").
52. See id. at 533-34 (noting that Lafferty did not determine elements that
plaintiff must prove to sustain deepening insolvency cause of action). The court
did, however, find that Lafferty offered guidance on the issue. Id.
53. See id. (noting that District Court of Delaware and District Court for East-
ern District of Pennsylvania have both held that plaintiff must show fraud to sus-
tain deepening insolvency cause of action).
54. See id. at 534 (recognizing defendant's argument that court in Lafferty re-
lied on case that "permitted recovery for mere negligence," but noting that,
"[d]espite this, Lafferty talks in terms of fraud").
55. See id. (requiring that fraud, and not negligence, is required for deepen-
ing insolvency). The court noted that it is generally agreed that there are five
elements of fraud: "'a representation of material fact, falsity, scienter, reliance and
injury."' Id. "Furthermore, the fraudulent conduct must be suffered by the
debtor-not merely an individual creditor." Id. The court further noted that "the
fraud alleged must be a harm to the corporation." Id.
56. 269 B.R. 721, 728 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001).
2007]
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knowledged that deepening insolvency may be an independent cause of
action. 57 The court noted that "[t]he financial hardships which possibly
resulted from the increased insolvency were not necessarily forthcoming,
and if it can be proven that they were a result of the increased insolvency,
liability may be found."5 8 The court cited to Lafferty in holding that incur-
rence of additional debt after the debtor became insolvent "may provide a
measure of damages recoverable by the Trustee."
59
In Smith v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 6° the plaintiff alleged, among other
things, that the defendants misrepresented "(not necessarily intentionally)
the firm's financial condition." 61 In response, the defendants argued that
any harm that resulted from their actions was not an actionable harm to
the debtor. 62 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, cited to Laf-
ferty for the proposition "that 'prolonging an insolvent corporation's life
through bad debt may' dissipate corporate assets and thereby harm the
value of corporate property."63 Thus, the court concluded that the com-
plaint stated a cognizable harm to the debtor in alleging that the defend-
ants artificially prolonged the debtor's existence. 64
In In re LTV Steel Company,65 a group of potential claimants asked the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio to grant
its motion requesting permission to prosecute its complaint.6 6 The court
57. Id. at 728 (granting, in case brought by trustee against financial advisor
corporation and employees for negligence in valuing acquired companies, possi-
bility of deepening insolvency as valid cause of action under Florida law).
58. Id. The court likened the deepening insolvency of a corporation to a
boxer's situation. In a colorful analogy, the court stated the following:
To utilize judicial/artistic license, the Debtor's situation was not like an
individual who sits in the rain all day and simply cannot get more wet. It
is more akin to a boxer with one black eye who, despite being injured,
might still persevere and win the fight. If that boxer (the debtor) winds
up losing the fight and landing in the hospital (bankruptcy court), a doc-
tor (judge) might find that it was the additional injuries (deepening in-
solvency) which put him there.
Id. at n.4.
59. Id. at 728 (applying rule from Lafferty to case before Bankruptcy Court).
60. 421 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing deepening insolvency as valid
claim in case involving defendants accused of keeping insolvent corporation afloat
for extended period despite knowledge that it rightfully should have declared
bankruptcy).
61. Id. at 995 (reiterating facts stated in complaint).
62. See id. at 1003 (noting defendant's argument that any harm was harm to
debtor's creditors; therefore, trustee, standing in debtor's shoes, could not bring
cause of action based on this harm).
63. Id. at 1004 (quoting Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Laf-
ferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 350 (3d Cir. 2001)).
64. See id. (concluding that corporation is harmed by party who prolongs its
existence).
65. 333 B.R. 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (recognizing deepening insolvency
as valid claim in case between corporation's bankruptcy estate and corporation
accused of incurring unnecessary debt and devaluing assets to the detriment of its
creditors).
66. Id. at 402-03.
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granted the group's motion, allowing them to prosecute their complaint,
which included one count alleging that,
As a proximate result of the grossly negligent, reckless and/or
bad faith prolongation of the Debtor's existence, Defendants' ac-
tions caused the Debtor to sink deeper into insolvency by incur-
ring additional liabilities. . . . As a proximate result of the
negligent prolongation of the Debtor's existence and deepening
insolvency, the value of the Debtor's business that could have
been realized had the corporation's existence not been pro-
longed was lost .... *67
Thus, the court appeared to say that a plaintiff can sustain a deepening
insolvency claim based on negligence.
B. Deepening Insolvency as a Measure of Damages
There are some courts that recognize deepening insolvency as a mea-
sure of damages for a separate tort, as opposed to an independent tort in
and of itself. For example, in Kittay v. Atlantic Bank of New York (In re Global
Service Group LLC),6 8 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of NewYork weighed in on the theory of deepening insolvency. In
addressing this theory, the court first noted that some courts have recog-
nized deepening insolvency as an independent tort, while others have rec-
ognized it as a theory of damages. 69 The court also noted that those
decisions discussing New York's acceptance of the theory of deepening
67. Id. at 421. While all of the cases discussed above deal with whether or not
deepening insolvency is a valid independent tort or theory of damages for conduct
occurring pre-petition, the LTV Steel court addressed the validity of a deepening
insolvency claim for conduct occurring post-petition. In addition to the allega-
tions arising from pre-petition conduct, the plaintiff in LTV Steel also alleged:
In at least early September 2001, at the latest, LTV Steel's and LTV Cor-
poration's directors and officers appear to have been aware that LTV
Steel may soon be unable to pay its post[-]petition debts .... However,
LTV Steel continued to incur additional trade debt which it either knew
or should have known it could not pay in full ....
Id. at 403-04. As such, the plaintiff asserted a deepening insolvency claim for "arti-
ficially and wrongfully prolonging the corporation's existence through the incur-
rence of spurious debt from at least September through November 20, 2001." Id.
at 404. Since LTV Steel was a New Jersey corporation, the court reviewed the
Third Circuit's decision in Lafferty and the Delaware Bankruptcy Court's decision
in Exide. See id. at 422. Since both the Lafferty and Exide courts held that deepen-
ing insolvency is a valid cause of action, the LTV Steel court held that deepening
insolvency arguably applies and, therefore, allowed the Plaintiff to pursue its deep-
ening insolvency claim. See id. (discussing courts' growing acceptance of deepen-
ing insolvency theory).
68. 316 B.R. 451 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (declining to recognize deepening
insolvency as independent cause of action under New York law in case between
Trustee and lender whose loan to insolvent debtor allowed debtor to fall deeper
into insolvency).
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insolvency regard deepening insolvency as a measure of damages. 70 The
court concluded, however, that
The distinction between "deepening insolvency" as a tort or dam-
age theory may be one unnecessary to make. Prolonging an in-
solvent corporation's life, without more, will not result in liability
under either approach. Instead, one seeking to recover for
"deepening insolvency" must show that the defendant prolonged
the company's life in breach of a separate duty, or committed an
actionable tort that contributed to the continued operation of a
corporation and its increased debt.7'
The court then noted that extending credit to an insolvent corporation
cannot be a tort because, "if it was, most companies in financial distress
would be forced to liquidate."72 Along the same lines, the court rejected
the notion that "managers of an insolvent limited liability company are
under an absolute duty to liquidate the company .... -73 Therefore, the
court concluded that deepening insolvency can be a measure of damages
when the plaintiff adequately demonstrates that the defendant committed
a separate tort.
In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of VarTec Telecom, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Finance Cooperative (In re VarTec Telecom, Inc.),74 the court ad-
dressed the question of "whether 'deepening insolvency' may be pled as a
separate cause of action or whether it is treated only as a breach of a sepa-
rate duty under state tort law or as a theory of damages." 75 After acknowl-
edging that other courts have recognized deepening insolvency as a
separate cause of action, the court noted that
The words "deepening insolvency" are neither contained in the
Bankruptcy Code, nor do they arise from other federal law, so
the courts that consider the theory of "deepening insolvency" to
70. See id. at 458 (citing to New York deepening insolvency cases).
71. Id. (finding that independent cause of action for deepening insolvency,
without breach of separate duty, such as fraud, is not supported by case law of New
York and other jurisdictions).
72. Id. at 459 (finding that type of loan issued in case was issued based on
strength of relationship between defendant bank and insider defendants, which "is
neither surprising nor improper").
73. Id. The court discussed the fact that "there is no absolute duty under
American law to shut down and liquidate an insolvent corporation," as is the case
in some foreign jurisdictions. Id. at 460. "In fact, chapter 11 is based on the ac-
cepted notion that a business is worth more to everyone alive than dead." Id.
74. 335 B.R. 631 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (refusing to recognize independent
tort for deepening insolvency under Texas law in case between corporation's un-
secured creditors and secured creditors accused of making loans to debtor corpo-
ration, despite debtor's apparent financial decline).
75. Id. at 633 (stating sole issue before court).
986 [Vol. 52: p. 975
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be an actionable tort do so by predicting how their respective
state courts would rule when adopting a new cause of action.
7 6
As such, the court looked to Texas law and, after a long discussion about
the origins and development of the theory of deepening insolvency, con-
cluded that the Texas Supreme Court would not recognize deepening in-
solvency as a separate tort "because the injury caused by the deepening of
a corporation's insolvency is substantially duplicated by torts already estab-
lished in Texas." 77 Although the VarTec court refused to recognize deep-
ening insolvency as an independent tort, the court seemed to indicate that
deepening insolvency is a valid theory for damages. 78 Specifically, the
court noted that "as the case law in this area has shown, for a plaintiff to
assert a valid claim for damages under a theory of 'deepening insolvency'
the plaintiff must show that the defendant has committed some other
tort."
79
In Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater Southeast Community Hospital Corp. I),80
the court revisited its earlier opinion finding that a corporation's deepen-
ing insolvency can be harmful. 81 The court, however, rejected the distinc-
tion made by some courts between fraud and negligence, noting that it is
not "aware of any common law principle holding that an injury sustained
as a result of one tort (fraud) is somehow not an injury when it is caused
by a different tort (negligence)." 8 2 As a result, the court held that
"[u]nless and until this court is told differently by a higher court in its own
circuit, deepening insolvency will remain a viable theory of damages in
this jurisdiction regardless of whether the injury occurred as a result of
negligence or fraud."8 3
Another case to address deepening insolvency was Amato v. Southwest
Florida Heart Group, P.A. (In re Southwest Florida Heart Group, P.A.). 8 4 In this
case, the court concluded that, with regard to the trustee's deepening in-
solvency claim, "such issues will be relevant to the measure of damages
only[ ] and cannot constitute a viable claim in its own right. '8 5
76. Id. at 638-39.
77. Id. at 644.
78. See id. at 645 (explaining potential for recovering damages for deepening
insolvency).
79. Id. at 644.
80. 353 B.R. 324 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2006) (recognizing deepening insolvency as
theory of harm, and not as independent tort, in case involving corporate officers
accused of enabling debtor corporation to incur more debt as part of Ponzi
scheme).
81. See id. at 336 (discussing CitXs potential impact on court's opinion).
82. Id. at 337.
83. Id. at 338.
84. 346 B.R. 897, 898 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (refusing to recognize indepen-
dent cause of action for deepening insolvency under Florida law).
85. Id. at 898.
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C. Deepening Insolvency - A Legal Fiction
Recently, there have been a few courts that have outright rejected the
concept of deepening insolvency altogether. For example, in Coroles v.
Sabey,8 6 the Utah Court of Appeals stated, "We decline Plaintiffs' invitation
to recognize 'deepening insolvency,' the only theory of damages that
Plaintiffs argue on appeal, as sufficient damages. Although deepening in-
solvency might harm a corporation's shareholders, it does not, without
more, harm the corporation itself."
87
In Bondi v. Bank of America Corporation (In re Parmalat),88 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, analyzing
North Carolina law, dismissed the deepening insolvency claim on the basis
that it was duplicative.8 9 The court reasoned that the cause of action for
breach of fiduciary duties will cover any damages for prolonging the life of
an insolvent corporation. 90
Recently, one of the most influential courts in the country, the Chan-
cery Court in Delaware, weighed in on this issue of deepening insolvency.
In Trenwick American Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P.,9 1 Vice Chan-
cellor Strine issued a decision concluding that Delaware would not recog-
nize deepening insolvency as a viable cause of action. 92 This decision is
particularly important because so many corporations are incorporated in
Delaware, and Delaware law governs the question of whether deepening
insolvency is a valid cause of action for corporations incorporated in that
state. Vice Chancellor Strine thoughtfully reviewed all of the relevant de-
cisions of other courts and concluded that the well-established body of
86. 79 P.3d 974 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting deepening insolvency as the-
ory of damages under Utah law in case involving investors in failed corporation
and those who gave them allegedly fraudulent information and financial support
during formation of corporation).
87. Id. at 983 (affirming trial court's dismissal of claim).
88. 383 F. Supp. 2d 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (refusing to recognize deepening
insolvency as valid claim for damages under North Carolina law in case involving
Italian corporation's Extraordinary Commissioner, analog to American trustee,
and lender bank accused of structuring transactions that defrauded corporation
and its debtors).
89. See id. at 602 (rejecting deepening insolvency as independent cause of
action).
90. See id. at 601-02 ("If officers and directors can be shown to have breached
their fiduciary duties by deepening a corporation's insolvency, and the resulting
injury to the corporation is cognizable . . . , that injury is compensable on a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty.").
91. 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006).
92. See id. at 174-75 (rejecting concept of deepening insolvency, court stated
that "so long as directors are respectful of the corporation's obligation to honor
the legal rights of its creditors, they should be free to pursue in good faith profit
for the corporation's equity holders"). The court went on to say that "Even when
the firm is insolvent, directors are free to pursue value maximizing strategies, while
recognizing that the firm's creditors have become its residual claimants and the
advancement of their best interests has become the firm's principal objective." Id.
at 175.
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fiduciary responsibility law in Delaware was well-equipped to deal with is-
sues of directors' responsibility. 9 3 Thus, the court reasoned, to adopt the
cause of action of deepening insolvency would be inconsistent with the
directors' fiduciary duties to pursue value-maximizing strategies, as the ex-
isting scope of fiduciary duty law and the business judgment rule make
clear that directors are to be insulated from liability for decisions that sim-
ply turn out badly. 94 As the court noted:
If the board of an insolvent corporation, acting with due dili-
gence and good faith, pursues a business strategy that it believes
will increase the corporation's value, but that also involves the
incurrence of additional debt, it does not become a guarantor of
that strategy's success. That the strategy results in continued in-
solvency and an even more insolvent entity does not in itself give
rise to a cause of action. Rather, in such a scenario the directors
are protected by the business judgment rule. To conclude other-
wise would fundamentally transform Delaware law. 95
On August 14, 2007, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Dela-
ware Chancery Court's decision in Trenwick.96 The opinion consisted of
the following ruling:
This 14th day of August 2007, the Court, having considered this
matter after oral argument and on the briefs and supplemental
memoranda filed by the parties, has determined that the final
judgment of the Court of Chancery should be affirmed on the
basis of and for the reasons assigned by the Court of Chancery in
its opinion dated August 10, 2006.
97
Although the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme
Court have not specifically discussed the concept of deepening insolvency
as a measure of damages, it is unlikely that either would accept this con-
cept in light of their Trenwick rulings.
In one of the most recent cases to address deepening insolvency,
Schnelling v. Crawford (In re James River Coal Company),98 the court con-
93. See id. at 204-07 (explaining that Delaware law offers alternative avenues of
relief for plaintiffs). The court stated that "The rejection of an independent cause
of action for deepening insolvency does not absolve directors of insolvent corpora-
tions of responsibility. Rather, it remits plaintiffs to the contents of their traditional
toolkit, which contains, among other things, causes of action for breach of fiduci-
ary duty and for fraud." Id. at 205.
94. See id. at 204-05.
95. Id. at 205.
96. See Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495, 2006, 2007 Del. LEXIS
357 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007).
97. Id. at *1.
98. 360 B.R. 139 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (rejecting deepening insolvency as
independent cause of action under Virginia law in case involving liquidating trust
and former directors accused of conducting transactions with shareholders pro-
longing corporation's apparent insolvency).
20071 989
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cluded that deepening insolvency is not a viable cause of action under
Virginia law.9 9 The court first noted that the Virginia Supreme Court has
yet to decide whether deepening insolvency is a valid independent tort.10 0
As such, the court was required to predict how the Virginia Supreme
Court would rule on this issue. 10 1 The court traced the roots of the deep-
ening insolvency theory and noted that some courts have found deepen-
ing insolvency to be an independent tort, while others have found it to
only be a measure of damages. 10 2 In rejecting the theory of deepening
insolvency altogether, the court cited to Trenwick and concluded that to
recognize such a theory "would fundamentally transform Virginia
law .... 103
V. SEITZ v. DETWEILER, HERSHEY AND ASSOCIATES, P.C. (IN RE CITX
CORPORATIoN): THE THIRD CIRCUIT SETS STRICT BOUNDARIES
FOR DEEPENING INSOLVENCY
The Third Circuit addressed the theory of deepening insolvency for
the second time in Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Associates, P.C. (In re CitX
Corporation).10 4 In CitX the Third Circuit specifically discussed three ques-
tions: (1) is deepening insolvency a viable theory of damages for negli-
gence; (2) is negligence sufficient to support a deepening insolvency
99. See id. at 179.
100. See id. at 178 (analyzing other states' acceptance or rejection of deepen-
ing insolvency theory).
101. See id. ("When questions of state law which have not been addressed by
the highest or intermediate appellate courts of the state are presented to a federal
court, the law requires the federal court to forecast what the state supreme court
would hold if it were presented with the issue.").
102. See id. at 178-80 (surveying courts that have weighed in on theory of
deepening insolvency).
103. Id. at 179. In so concluding, the court echoed the sentiment of the Dela-
ware Chancery Court:
No court applying Virginia law has ever recognized an independent cause
of action premised solely upon a company's economic decline. Virginia
law does not require a financially challenged company to abruptly
windup [sic] its business affairs and liquidate its assets. The Board of
Directors must remain free to exercise its good faith business judgment
that will allow it to pursue strategies the board views as sound to turn the
company around.
Id. (footnote omitted).
104. 448 F.3d 672 (3d Cir. 2006). The debtor was an internet company that
filed for bankruptcy protection, and it was alleged that it was involved in a Ponzi
scheme. See id. at 674-76 (discussing background of case). The trustee filed a com-
plaint in bankruptcy court against the Debtor's accounting firm and an individual
partner of the accounting firm alleging malpractice, deepening insolvency, breach
of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation. See id. The reference to the
bankruptcy court was withdrawn, and the district court initially granted summary
judgment to the defendants on the negligent misrepresentation claim. See id. The
district court eventually granted the defendants' motion for summaryjudgment on
the negligence and deepening insolvency claims and the Trustee appealed to the
Third Circuit. See id.
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cause of action; and (3) can deepening insolvency be a cause of action
under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 or 541.115
With regard to the first issue, the court looked to the definition of
deepening insolvency set forth in Lafferty and found that,
Although we did describe deepening insolvency as a "type of in-
jury," and a "theory of injury," we never held that it was a valid
theory of damages for an independent cause of action. Those
statements in Lafferty were in the context of a deepening[ ]insol-
vency cause of action. They should not be interpreted to create a
novel theory of damages for an independent cause of action like
malpractice. 106
The court then addressed the issue of whether negligence is sufficient
to support a deepening insolvency cause of action. The court was faced
with this issue because the trustee brought a cause of action for deepening
insolvency but did not provide any support for a claim of fraudulent con-
duct. 10 7 "Without fraud, Seitz [Trustee] must fall back on his allegation
that [defendant] negligently deepened CitX's insolvency."' 0 8 The court
then analyzed whether negligence can support a claim for deepening in-
solvency and noted that Lafferty held only that fraudulent conduct, and
not negligence, can support a deepening insolvency claim.1 0 9 The court
held that "We know no reason to extend the scope of deepening insol-
vency beyond Lafferty's limited holding. To that end, we hold that a claim
of negligence cannot sustain a deepening[ ]insolvency cause of action."
11 0
With regard to the third issue, the Third Circuit held that a deepen-
ing insolvency claim cannot be brought under 11 U.S.C. § 544: "Because
deepening[ ]insolvency claims are brought on behalf of the debtor corpo-
ration, deepening insolvency can only be a claim under Bankruptcy Code
§ 541 (which deals with property of the debtor's estate)."11 1 In so finding,
the Third Circuit clarified that the cause of action of deepening insolvency
does not belong to the creditors of the corporation.
112
105. See generally id.
106. Id. at 677 (internal citations omitted).
107. See id. at 680 (determining whether allegation of negligence can sustain
deepening insolvency claim).
108. Id. (stating issue after having dismissed possibility of Trustee alleging
fraud on part of defendants).
109. See id. at 681 (limiting Lafferty holding to fraudulent conduct).
110. Id. (refusing to find claim of negligence sufficient to sustain cause of
action for deepening insolvency, given limit of Lafferty).
111. Id. at 676 n.6. (internal citations omitted).
112. Id. (explaining that Section 544 only implicates trustee's avoidance pow-
ers for benefit of creditors and purchasers).
2007]
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VI. IMPACT: THE FUTURE OF DEEPENING INSOLVENCY OUTSIDE OF THE
THIRD CIRCUIT
Just as the Third Circuit's opinion in Lafferty influenced courts across
the country in answering the question of whether to embrace the concept
of deepening insolvency, CitXwill now have a similar, albeit opposite, im-
pact. Courts that previously followed the reasoning of Lafferty and ac-
cepted the theory of deepening insolvency as a broad theory are now likely
to revisit their positions when faced with a deepening insolvency case.
Likewise, courts that were previously skeptical to follow the broad reason-
ing of Lafferty will welcome the CitX court's narrowing of the deepening
insolvency theory and now cite to CitX for support in their dismissal or
narrow acceptance of this theory. These conservative courts will likely find
that, at the very least, a showing of fraud is required to sustain a cause of
action under the theory of deepening insolvency.
The writing on the wall is clear: the trend of courts refusing to recog-
nize deepening insolvency as a cause of action or as a measure of damages
is the correct one and one that the supreme courts of the states within the
Third Circuit-specifically Pennsylvania and New Jersey-are likely to
eventually adopt. The Third Circuit started a chain reaction that will even-
tually eliminate any and all acceptance of deepening insolvency by recog-
nizing, through its holding in CitX that its holding in Lafferty was flawed.
Delaware has already eliminated deepening insolvency as an indepen-
dent cause of action. As discussed above, the preliminary writing on the
wall in Delaware came from the Delaware Court of Chancery, an influen-
tial court in the corporate world, which had refused to recognize deepen-
ing insolvency. Then, on August 14, 2007, the Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery's Trenwick decision and perma-
nently eliminated deepening insolvency as an independent cause of action
in that state." 3 The inevitable impact of the Delaware Supreme Court's
ruling cannot be overstated. Because courts around the country dealing
with corporate and bankruptcy law issues most often look to Delaware case
law for guidance, courts will become even more skeptical of the deepening
insolvency theory and refuse to adopt it or, at the very least, reevaluate
their positions.
The impact of Citx and Trenwick has already become apparent in
Pennsylvania. On September 20, 2007, the Common Pleas Court of Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania issued a decision in which, among other things, it
dismissed the trustee's count for deepening insolvency.' 1 4 In Miller, the
plaintiffs argued that Pennsylvania law applied and the defendants argued
that Delaware law applied to the question of whether the plaintiffs could
113. See Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495, 2006, 2007 Del. LEXIS
357 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007) (affirming decision of Court of Chancery against claim of
deepening insolvency as independent cause of action).
114. Miller v. Santilli, No. 1225, 2007 Phila. C.P. LEXIS 252, at *10-13 (Phila.
C.P. Sept. 20, 2007).
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sustain a cause of action for deepening insolvency. 115 The court, however,
stated that there was no actual conflict of law since "neither state recog-
nizes a cause of action for deepening insolvency." 116 In so noting, the
court cited to the Chancery Court's holding in Trenwick that there is no
cause of action for deepening insolvency in Delaware.' 17 With regard to
Pennsylvania, the court first noted that "no Pennsylvania state court has
ever recognized a cause of action for deepening insolvency."' 18 The court
then cited to CitX and its narrowing of the Lafferty holding in finding that
a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant engaged in fraudulent
conduct to sustain a cause of action for deepening insolvency. 119 After
noting that it was not bound by a federal court's interpretation of state
law, the court ultimately went a step farther and held that "once the ulti-
mate harm from an unrestrained deepening insolvency has been suffered
and bankruptcy has occurred, traditional claims for fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty, which 'have been carefully shaped by generations of experi-
ence,' are sufficient to recover for any wrongdoing."] 20
CitX and Trenwick are two of the most recent cases adding fuel to the
flame that is engulfing the deepening insolvency theory and eliminating it
altogether. These decisions from the Third Circuit and the Delaware
Chancery and Supreme Courts have greatly influenced courts' approaches
to the theory. Because the Third Circuit helped shape and define deepen-
ing insolvency, and because the Delaware Chancery and Supreme Courts
are perhaps the most influential courts in the country on corporate law
issues, the fact that these courts have narrowed the acceptance of this the-
ory is monumental. Furthermore, these courts are recognizing that direc-
tors and officers should be encouraged to take reasoned, calculated risks,
regardless of the outcome, without fear of retribution in hindsight. The
economy thrives and advances only in an environment where companies
have an opportunity to explore means of greater success, which, in turn,
provides a greater benefit to shareholders and/or creditors.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the debate among the courts and bankruptcy practi-
tioners about the validity of deepening insolvency as a theory in general,
and as a cause of action or measure of damages in particular, is still in the
early stages. At least for the near future, however, practitioners in the
Third Circuit have a relatively established framework within which to
work. Specifically, when bringing a cause of action for deepening insol-
vency under Pennsylvania law, practitioners need to demonstrate that the
115. Id. at *10.
116. Id.
117. See id. at *11-12.
118. Id. at *12.
119. See id.
120. Id. at *13.
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defendant(s) committed fraud that led to the artificial prolongation of the
corporation's life; alleging mere negligence is not enough.
12 1
Because deepening insolvency is a state law issue, practitioners who
are working under Delaware law cannot bring a cause of action for deep-
ening insolvency in light of the Delaware Supreme Court's affirming of
the Delaware Chancery Court's Trenwick decision, which eliminated deep-
ening insolvency as a cause of action in Delaware. As a result, the relief in
the boardroom is that directors and officers may return to the business of
advancing their companies' interests, rather than looking over their shoul-
ders for the next lawsuit.
121. See Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP (In reStudent Fin. Corp.), 335 B.R.
539 (D. Del. 2005).
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